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iPREFACE
The past two years have witnessed considerable difficulty in
the marketing of New Zealand sheepmeats. The marketing system for
sheepmeat is currently under close examination.
This paper, written by Dr A.C. Zwart, Senior Lecturer in the
Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing at the College,
makes a special input to this examination. The point is well made
in the paper that the debate so far has centred on the type of
marketing institutions required (central control versus free
enterprise) rather than on how best to carry out the required
marketing functions. In concentrating on marketing functions,
Dr Zwart draws out some important principles for future sheepmeat
marketing systems, rather than arguing for central control or free
enterprise per se.
P.O. Chudleigh
Director
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SUMMARY
This paper has been prepared in recognition of the fact that
there is little available information, or research about the most suitable
form of marketing institution, which might lead to the development of an
appropriate marketing strategy for the New Zealand meat industry. Although
there has been considerable debate on this issue in the past decade, many
responses have been conditioned by political views, or individual roles
within the industry, and this has led to a polarisation of views. Rather
than discussiOng the functions which an institution might perform, or the
essential elements of a marketing strategy, views have centred around
preferences for "cen tral control II or "free enterprise".
A more general approach is developed in this paper, by firstly
analysing the difficulties which currently face the industry, and then
discussing the primary functions which a marketing institution might be
expected to perform. It is important to distinguish between apparent or
perceived problems such as instability, and the fundamental causes of such
problems. Whilst it is tempting to suggest that industry problems can be
overcome simply by increasing the degree of central control, it is realised
that creation of this type of intervention can create further costs and
difficulties in the future. It is also important to recognise that the so-
called "free enterprise" system which has been in operation for many years
is not necessarily an ideal form of competitive structure.
(3)
(4)
(2)
foll m<Jing
(1)
From the general discussion of problems and functions of marketing
institutions, and how they are related to the characteristics of the New
Zealand meat industry, two alternative proposals are discussed in some
detail. These proposals are suggested as examples of industry structures
which utilise the advantages of more effective competition, while at the
same time allowing for more centralised control from the Meat Producers Board.
The first of these proposals which is discussed in the most depth, utilises a
competitive market to establish prices for carcass meat in New Zealand. The
second proposal is essentially the same, except the competitive establishment
of prices is replaced by prices determined by the Meat Board.
The essential elements of both of these proposals include the
points:
The retention of competitive elements wherever possible
within the processing and marketing sectors of the meat
industry.
The establishment of base prices for carcass meat in New
Zealand and relatively free access by all exporters to
that meat. This is seen to be necessary to ensure that
meat exporters are placed in an environment which will ~e
conducive to maximum use of further processing and
sophisticated marketing techniques.
The Meat Board is seen to retain control over the setting
of the price levels and possibly differentials between
grades within New Zealand.
The Meat Board would also retain control of stocks of
meat which are necessary to maintain price levels, and
also to become the major contractor in single buyer, and
possibly development markets.
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In the development of appropriate marketing institutions, the
Government's role is seen to be that of ensuring that the solution reached
is one which will serve the best long term interests of the industry. A
tendency is noted for solutions of this nature to become compromises which
protect the interests of those organisations whic~current1y exist within
the industry. It is the Government's role to ensure that roles within the
industry are clearly defined, and that means are set up by which the
efficiency of the industry can be continuously monitored.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years disruptions in the marketing of New Zealand
sheepmeats have led to a continued discussion of alternative institutions
which could be developed to control and co-ordinate the marketing of these
products. Although the perceived problems of unstable prices, low returns,
and increasing levels of stocks have been all too obvious, there has been
relatively little investigation into the true causes of such problems. There
has been continued debate over the most suitable form of marketing institution
to overcome these problems and there has also been relatively little research
into the most desirable structure or functions which should be performed
by such an institution. At times the debate has been reduced to the level
of comparing single sellers with free enterprise without any attempt to
outline the mechanisms whereby these institutions might overcome the problems.
While this general debate has continued, the attempts to develop operational
institutions to overcome the problems would not appear to have been particularly
successful. The various solutions proposed over the period have clearly
reflected a compromise between the various parties involved. It would
appear that the Meat Board has acted to maintain price levels in the farmer1s
interests, but their lack of personnel and facilities for the marketing
of meat has led to a compromise in ensuring the profitability of export
marketing firms at least in the short run.
From an economic point of view, it would be surprising if compromises
of this nature were in the best long run national interest and for this
reason, there is an urgent need to consider the wider economic implications
of alternative institutions.
Unfortunately, there is a lack of research in this area and the
time available does not allow for a detailed study of the participants and
their role in the New Zealand meat industry.
This study does, however, attempt to discuss the problems and proposed
solutions from as wide a perspective as is possible. In the first section
of this paper, the problems facing the industry are discussed in some depth
in order to distinguish between the common "perceptions" of the problems,
and the fundamental causes and factors which could lead to such problems.
The second section outlines the major functions which are commonly expected
to be performed by marketing institutions and these are linked to the
characteristics of the New Zealand meat industry. Because of the tendency
to debate "institutions" rather than "functions" which are expected from
a marketing system, the wide range of industry structures which could
overcome the industry problems are often not appreciated. The final sections
of this paper present two alternative industry structures which provide
an example of how problems can be faced by utilising elements of both
competition and central control. The paper concludes with a brief discussion
of the government1s role in the development of a meat marketing system.
1. THE NATURE OF THE PROB~EMS
The development and understanding of the problems currently facing
the meat industry are largely developed from an earlier study, based on
a survey of a wide range of meat exporting companies [Ross, Sheppard and
Zwart (1982)J. This section briefly states those problems and provides
2a brief economic analysis of each in an attempt to understand causes of
these perceived problems. It should be noted that there can often be wide
discrepancies between the apparent or perceived problem and the underlying
cause. Naturally, this has major implications when providing solutions
to problems.
(1) The unstable nature of the United Kingdom market. Although
closely inter-related with other problems s this is probably one of the most
widely discussed causes of problems in our present meat marketing system.
It would appear that one of the major concerns in the industry has been
an increasing instability in the prices received from the United Kingdom
market. Because of the traditional importance of these prices in setting
both schedule payments in New Zealand and prices in other markets, this
has become a growing concern to the entire industry. Suggested causes
of this problem include the increasing use of larger ships, the selling
ex-docks, the system of pool selling and the general diminishing size of
the United Kingdom market.
There has also been considerable discussion about the prevalence
of what has become known as "wea k sell ing ll • Thi s practi ce has generally
been attributed to the fact that there are considered to be too many exporters
operating in the United Kingdom market. This term has no meaning in an
economic sense, but in commercial practice it would appear to be a situation
where individual sellers undercut one another in order to make a sale. From
discussions in the industry it is generally felt that this practice is caused
solely by the presence of too many sellers in the market and that the limiting
of these sellers would remove the problem to a large extent. In economic
terms, this argument has little meaning as there is no guarantee that merely
removing the sellers from the market would limit any effective competition.
It is interesting to note that of the thirty-three sellers active in the
United Kingdom market, five have sales shares totalling 93% (Cullwick, 1980).
The only benefit which would occur from limiting exporters would be if those
exporters were to become collusive in their pricing behaviour. Of course
it should be realised that if they are able to collude over pricing of the
final product, it is also possible for them to collude over the pricing
of the marketing services which they provide, which may not be in the best
interest in the long run.
In searching for alternative causes of this apparent problem it
is possible that the practice of pool selling may have been more important
than previously recognised. Under the pooling system, which has increased
rapidly over the past ten years, the exporter who makes the selling decision
in the U.K. is effectively only a commission agent of the individual producer.
In these cases the product is effectively consigned to an exporter by the
individual farmer at time of slaughter and the exporter1sobjective is simply
to maximise the revenue from the sale of that product. Because the exporter1s
costs relate to services rendered such as killing, processing, transport
and handling, it is likely to be in the exporter1s best interests to carry
that product as far down the marketing chain as possible, but at the end
point he is not responsible for the price of the product. It is possible
that this system of selling could very readily lead to a situation where
exporters undercut each other in order to dispose of the product. It is
interesting to speculate how such a practice has grown over the years when
it is effectively equivalent to consignment selling which has been condemned
for many years.
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It is commonly argued that price pooling was not the major cause
of this instability because not all of the product was in fact shipped
in pools, and some product purchased on schedule and owned by exporting
companies was also being sold on the same market. Whilst this would
appear to be reasonable argument, it must be noted that schedule price
itself is not a true market price, but a reflection of what exporters
expect to receive for future shipments, and this price is based to some
extent on current U.K. prices. Thus, in a situation where weak selling
was occurring in the pools, there would be considerable pressure to
reduce schedule prices in future periods. It is perhaps this type of
behaviour which meant that for a number of years there was only a
relatively small margin between returns which producers could receive
from selling on schedule and exporting on pools. Although the ability
to use the open door policy and sell through pools was seen by farmers
as being their protection against exploitive pricing on the schedule,
this was almost certainly not the case. From the above reasoning it
can be seen that the exporters· margins for marketing services were
assured regardless of whether the farmer shipped through pool or sold
on schedule. This was probably made even easier by the fact that many
of the charges for these marketing services were not made apparent in
schedule pricing.
This alternative explanation of the cause of unstable United
Kingdom prices and weak selling suggests that perhaps the problems lie
not in the number of exporters, but in the manner in which the product
was sold, and the manner in which the product is priced to the producer
in New Zealand.
(2) Instability caused by large contractual purchases. With
the increased diversification away from the United Kingdom market, there
has been a dramatic increase over the past years in the use of large
contracts with purchasing agents from particular countries. It has
long been argued that the size of these contracts and their potential
impact on prices has made it important to consider ways in which these
purchases can be controlled so that all producers may share in the
benefits of the returns from these contracts without creating excessive
instability.
The presence of this type of contract has led to the creation
of a wide variety of arrangements between private companies and the Meat
Board to facilitate trading with the individual nations concerned.
Although these arrangements have been satisfactory in many cases, they
have still not removed the impact of these contracts on the market. It
was well recognised that during 1982 and 1983 seasons, the absence or
presence of Iranian contracts had a considerable effect on prices in
other markets. Rather than finding ways of coping with the requirements
of these importers it may be worthwhile to search for alternative
procedures which might limit these effects. For example, it may be
better to guide these importers towards purchasing from a competitive
market on a more continuous basis. In this case the implications of the
purchases are revealed immediately, rather than being a topic for
discussion in contract negotiations.
It is generally considered that contract negotiations where a
single buyer is faced by a single seller are in our best interest.
This may not always be the case. For example, consider the alternative
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situations. In the case of a rising market it would be expected that
negotiators would argue that the importer should pay a price higher than
ruling world prices because of the effects that their substantial pur-
chases will have on the price. In this situation, negotiators must
attempt to estimate the impact that these purchases are likely to have
on the price. In an alternative case, such as existed in 1983, where
market conditions are generally weak, the situation would be reversed
and one would expect that the negotiators would be prepared to accept
a price somewhat lower than the existing market price because of the
effects which the contractual purchase will have on prices in other
markets. It is these different situations which can lead to extreme
fluctuations in prices, and the outcome depends on the individual
negotiating abilities and the current market situation. It would
almost certainly be in the nation1s best long term interests if
these type of purchases could be converted into smaller and more con-
tinuous purchases which may be made at times when market conditions are
most appropriate.
(3) Increasing level of vertical integration in processing and
marketing. Previous studies have noted the movement towards increased
vertical integration in the processing and marketing of New Zealand
meat. This may not necessarily be a cause of concern, as in many
industries vertical integration can lead to increased efficiencies
and economies, but it is important to consider the particular causes
of this movement. The vertical integration appears to have come from
both directions, as many companies previously involved in only the
marketing of meat have become involved in processing, and similarly,
companies previously involved only in processing have seen fit to expand
their operations to incorporate marketing. Many of the marketing
companies claim that they have become involved in processing to ensure
suitable access to stock. In theory, this should not have been a
problem as the lI open door" policy was intended to ensure that any producer
could have his stock killed and supplied to the exporter of his choice,
but there did appear to be problems arising from this arrangement.
Problems in ensuring that stock could be killed were aggravated by pressure
on killing facilities caused by drought conditions and strikes at individual
processing plants. For these reasons many producers felt that their interests
could be better served by selling stock through larger processing companies
with their own slaughter facilities. This may not have presented any major
problem if individual marketing companies were able to purchase carcass
meat from the processing companies themselves, but this option was limited
by the integration of many purely processing companies into the marketing
of meat. Although the exact causes of this movement are unclear, it is
possible that the protection offered by relatively fixed marketing charges
and commissions made this an attractive option for these companies. In
general, there appears to have been a very protective attitude amongst
exporters towards maintaining control over supplies of product.
In hindsight, it would appear that there was considerable degree
of competition between exporters and exporter processors as to who would
control the marketing of the stock on the producers' behalf. These
observations further support the idea that many meat exporters were not
accepting a significant part of the financial risk involved in the marketing
of the stock which may also go part way to explaining the attitude of many
firms towards market development.
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(4) The lack of market development. Over the past decade there
has been repeated discussion of the need to develop a more sophisticated
approach to the marketing of New Zealand meat products. Reports such as
those by Silcock and Sheppard (1981) and Beckman and Bourke (1980) have
discussed the benefits to a nation and individual firms of an increased
expansion in further processing, but have concluded that there has not
been a very rapid uptake of these ideas. Although there has been a rapid
diversification away from the United Kingdom market, much of this development
has been through larger contractual arrangements such as those discussed
previously. Such developments are not as attractive as the securing of
more steady markets for more sophisticated and possibly higher valued
product.
It has been argued by some exporters that this lack of development
is attributable to the fact that market development expenditures cannot
be recouped by an individual firm without other firms acquiring a share
of that particular market. Theoretically one would expect that a firm
might retain control over a particular market through the development of
specialised products and goodwill associated with marketing services.
One major problem appears to have been the lack of access to supplies
discussed above. Whilst it may have been possible for smaller companies
to initiate markets in particular countries any growth in demand was likely
to cause problems through that company's lack of access to meat supplies.
With the vertically integrated system described previously any growth in
demand would have to be met by a firm's moving into processing or alternatively
making arrangements with further producers to sell stock to their particular
company. In fact, the firm which had developed the market would be vulnerable
to having the market taken away by a company which had access to supplies
of meat. In a more flexible or competitive system this firm should have
been able to have purchased access to more meat or alternatively to form
a merger which would make use of the goodwill and possibly the brand name
which had been developed.
The lack of market development has been one of the major reasons
why many producers have been concerned about the current industry structure.
Before it can be said that a competitive marketing system cannot cope with
the problem of market development, it is necessary to ensure that firms
are competing in the most appropriate manner. Many commentators on the
current marketing problems have presumed that the existence of free enterprise
in the marketing system for meat products had led to a suitable form of
competitive behavior.
(5) The lack of a planning environment. Over the past two years
a relatively new problem has emerged and is becoming increasingly important.
During this period there has been continued discussion and re-negotiation
of the basis for conducting New Zealand's trade in meat.. To the author's
knowledge there have been at least three proposals which were at the time
stated as being solutions to the meat industry problems. At best these
proposals have been mere compromises which have been arrived at usually
in great haste. While this may be a necessary part of the evolution towards
a superior system, it has created considerable uncertainty and a complete
lack of a suitable environment for individual firms to plan. In economic
terms the uncertainty of the market place has been replaced by the uncertainty
of the environment in which the producers must operate. It is totally
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unrealistic to expect firms or organisations to invest time and financial
resources in market, or further processing development, when they are uncertain
of the future in which they are likely to be trading. Instead, as these
various schemes have evolved individual institutions have sought to
maximise or protect their short term returns.
The particular problem areas discussed above are certainly not
an exhaustive list of the problems which a marketing system has faced in
the past, or is likely to face in the future, but the list does show the
highly inter-related nature of many of these problems. This fact becomes
more obvious when one looks beyond the simple perceived problem and considers
why that problem might arise. To many people, the observation of a problem
in something like a marketing system leads to the conclusion that increased
control over the behaviour of the individual operators in the marketing
system can control that problem.
It is an obvious temptation to state that market instability for
example, can be controlled through the use of price guidelines. Unfortunately
however, the consequences of that control or regulation is often not fully
appreciated, nor is it often appreciated that the creation of more effective
competition can lead to the solution of many of the problems. In order
that some of these relationships might be better understood, the following
section outlines some of the major functions which we would expect to see
performed in a system for marketing New Zealan~ meat products, and discusses
the nature of the institutions which might carry out such functions.
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF MARKETING SYSTEM AND EXPORT MARKETING INSTITUTIONS
The form of the marketing system which is best suited to a particular
industry is conditioned by the characteristics of that product and the functions
which the market must perform. The characteristics of the product include
such factors as the production methods used, the storability of the product,
the responsiveness and number of markets, as well as the external policies
which affect that product.
The functions which markets are expected to perform can vary
markedly. At its simplest we would expect the market system for a product
to determine an appropriate product flow between producers and consumers,
and also, to determine a set or level of prices which would allow this exchange
to take place. Many economists would argue that a completely free and
unrestricted market where producers and consumers are allowed to interact
amongst themselves would fulfil these functions, but it must also be recognised
that there are relatively few completely free market systems operating in
the world. Whether it is a case of true market failure or merely one of
a market generating undesirable charactistics, there are further functions
which people have come to expect markets to perform and which often result
in intervention. For example, it is commonly expected that market prices
should be stable and that producers' incomes should be at a reasonable
level, even though it can be argued that these functions can be performed
by a simple market system where storage or risk spreading schemes are used
to stabilise prices and incomes and free entry and exit of firms to maintain
incomes to producers.
7The degree of intervention in agricultural markets around the
world indicates that governments do not consider that these functions can
be performed satisfactorily by a purely free market system. This does not
imply that competitive elements of such markets do not remain, and
particular agricultural markets are probably some of the most competitive
in the world. The form of any intervention varies considerably, and
includes both macroeconomic and agricultural policy administered by governments.
This discussion is limited to considering the forms of intervention
which relate to controlling markets through the creation of market institutions.
Although these institutions are usually operated as autonomous bodies, it must
be recognised that they are often created by government legislation and in
many cases it is possible that the government views the creation of such
institutions as a means of granting protection to that industry. In such a
situation, the government can grant to producers the right to create a
monopoly institution which might be used to support producers at the expense
of local or international consumers. While the former is not uncommon in
New Zealand, the latter is generally considered to be a more acceptable
situation and is the basis of the development of single selling export
marketing institutions in New Zealand.
In an attempt to try to identify the relationships and trade-offs
which can exist between market functions, market institutions, and the
product characteristics, it is instructive to consider some of the major
functions which might be expected to be performed in a marketing system for
New Zealand sheepmeats.
(1) Stabilisation activities. As noted previously, intervention
in order to stabilise markets is probably one of the most common forms of
intervention which exists and can be performed by a wide range of institutions.
The need for such intervention is largely determined by the characteristics
of the product, and include delayed supply response, inelastic demand,
perishability of the product, and possibly even the large number of producers
and consumers in the market which limit the information flows. These
characteristics are often sufficient to generate high levels of instability
in agricultural markets.
There are two fundamental methods of stabilising prices in these
markets. Product storage is probably the most common method of stabilising
prices between periods. The function of purchasing product in one period
for resale in later periods is often performed in purely competitive markets
by traders who attempt to profit from price changes between periods. This
activity however, is often not viewed as sufficient to provide the required
degree of stability, and product purchase and resale is often undertaken by
a central organisation. The reasoning for aggregate intervention rather
than individual must lie in the fact that society sees the benefits of this
activity to be greater than those which can be attached to speculative
profits.
This function can be performed by a wide variety of institutions
and whilst it does require the organisation to be involved in ownership of
the product it does not require complete ownership of all the product
available. What it does require however, is a well designed pricing system
upon which the purchasing and resale activities can be based. An alternative
Mark
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method of operating effective storage stabilisation without involving the
creation of specialised trading facilities might be to simply offer a
subsidy to private operators to perform this function. The subsidy
offered should provide a measure of the difference between the private
valuation of the benefits from stock holding and the value which society
attaches to this activity.
The second major form of stabilisation activity is via price
smoothing or, alternatively, income smoothing. It must be noted that
these two concepts are not identical, but are obviously related, and
particular schemes may have different objectives. Again, it would normally
be assumed that a private system could perform this function by farmers
investing surplus income in the periods of higher prices in order to boost
income in less favourable periods. The great pressure for centralised
intervention in price smoothing schemes must again arise from the fact
that society views the spin-off effects of these price fluctuations as
impinging on other areas of the economy. A wide variety of these schemes
have been used in the New Zealand meat sector with the combination of
government and Meat Board control. The only resource requirement for such
activity is availability of finance. Conceptually, the schemes are merely
transferring price risk from individual producers to a central organisa-
tion. Whilst in theory such schemes could be run on a costless basis, it
is important to identify where elements of subsidisation may also become
involved. As in the case for storage stabilisation, there is also an
important requirement to identify well-defined markets upon which this
activity can be based.
In general, price stabilisation activity is viewed to be
important in the New Zealand meat markets and various versions of price
smoothing schemes have been used over the years. In recent years these
have become confused by the presence of alternative schemes which involve
high degrees of subsidisation. The use of product storage as a
stabilisation activity has been limited to attempts by the Meat
organisation to stabilise prices in the United Kingdom market.
these attempts appear to have been successful, it is recognised
United Kingdom is only a relatively small part of the market.
More recent activities of the Meat Board which have led to an
accumulation of meat stocks, might also be interpreted as an attempt at
stabilisation in order to overcome the instability caused by the uncertainty
of large contractual arrangements. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to
evaluate the efficiency or expected gains from such behaviour, largely
because of the difficulties involved in determining the reasonable level of
prices in the long term. One of the great dangers in excessive use of this
type of activity, without a clearly defined market base, is that stabilisa-
tion activities can very easily become confused with price supporting
activities that are trying to maintain long term prices. Failure to
realise the danger from this type of behaviour, has in the past led to
confusion in many agricultural markets.
(2) Market signals to producers. Because of the large number of
producers involved in meat production, it is extremely important that
clearly defined information about what and when to produce is provided to
producers. In economic theory of course, it is presumed that in a market
of this type, price differentials and changes are sufficient to indicate to
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producers how production should change, but there is often a large degree
of intervention in such activities, which can occur by either altering the
market price signals, or by directly dictating the quantity of output to be
produced.
In a free market situation, price signals offered to agricultural
producers are often perceived to be either excessively unstable or,
alternatively inequitable between different classes of producer. The equity
considerations are important when market prices vary both over time and
between quality levels. The two most common forms of price intervention
involve the pooling of prices over time, or over product qualities, and the
practice of price fixing which can affect time or quality differentials.
Price pooling has become a very common feature of many
agricultural marketing systems. It is generally seen to provide a more
equitable distribution of income to farmers as well as possibly smoothing
out short term price fluctuations. These functions can be performed by a
wide variety of institutions including privately organised cooperatives.
Price fixing on the other hand, is often stated to have the same objectives,
but in some situations can have a very different effect. While price
pooling is effectively a sharing of risk among individual producers, price
fixing usually involves a transference of risk between producers and other
participants in the marketing system. This is a very fundamental and
important difference which must be recognised when developing a marketing
system which involves activity by a number of parties in the marketing chain.
Unfortunately, relatively little is known about the impact that
changing market signals have on individual producers. For example, despite
the very large amount of discussion which has taken place about the
requirements of consumers for New Zealand carcass characteristics, very
little use has been made of market signals to attempt to pass this
information back to farmers. The recent study by Scobie and Jones (1983)
has indicated that while farmers are responsive to these signals,
relatively little use has been made of them in the past. It is of some
concern that so little information is available in this field, especially
as the choice of marketing institutions is very likely to have a profound
effect on the manner in which price signals are passed back to farmers.
There appear to be real trade-offs involved in this problem; between the
equity of sharing product returns between producers who produce different
qualities and at different times, and the benefits of attempting to produce
a product which is most compatible with consumer requirements. The fact
that there has been so much criticism of the lack of this activity under
the effective price fixing scheme, which has been used in New Zealand for
decades, suggests that it is arguable whether these functions can be
performed by a central organisation.
Quality signals usually involve the imposition of some
restriction on producers as to the quantity of product which they can
produce. This type of restriction is not generally seen to be a part of a
competitive enterprise, and is considered to be undesirable by most
agricultural producers and many governments. It can however, be a very
precise method for passing particular types of signals to producers. As
will be discussed later in reference to other market functions, the use of
such signals can be associated with specific types of institutions. For
example, it has been noted that in recent weeks the New Zealand Dairy
Board has been discussing the need for some control over quantities.
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In summary, the lack of clear market signals to producers in the
New Zealand meat industry has led to some of the problems discussed in the
previous section of the paper. Many exporters have argued that the
inability to signal to producers that they personally require more produce
to service a particular market has led to their loss of that particular
market to other exporters. While this may not appear to be a major
difficulty since the particular market is still being serviced, it can
lead to a general lack of incentive to develop markets, since exporters
find that they cannot capture sufficient benefits for themselves. At the
same time, the inability of our previous system to reflect true quality
signals has often been blamed as an impediment to further market develop-
ment where specific product characteristics are required.
(3) Responsiveness to consumers and market development. It is
generally presumed that an agricultural marketing system will be responsive
to changing requirements of consumers and will also lead to the exploitation
of opportunities in new markets as they are created. Normally, in a free
market situation the interaction of price information between producers and
consumers generates this type of activity. Unfortunately, the large number
of operators and the lack of contact between the producers and consumers can
at times cause considerable problems in markets for agricultural products
such as sheepmeats.
In many cases this problem can be overcome by the prOV1Slon of
market information which is usually subsidised. Such subsidised information
is presumably provided because the social benefits from the stability created
exceed the private benefits of carrying out such research. The grading of
agricultural products is a further activity common to agricultural marketing
institutions, and is often seen to increase the consumer1s choice and to
aid the producer by isolating different demands for a particular product.
Other forms of intervention which attempt to increase the market responsive-
ness to consumers and the rate at which markets grow, involve the provision
of such activities as promotion and other more sophisticated forms of market
management. Generic promotion of agricultural products is now a very
common function of agricultural marketing institutions around the world.
While such programmes are generally thought to be effective, this
effectiveness has often proved difficult to measure. These forms of inter-
vention which are generally seen to be low cost can be provided by a wide
range of marketing systems, and are often carried out by the government.
The growth of marketing management as a field of business science
has led to increasing discussion of the role of many other alternative
techniques in making agricultural markets more responsive to consumer wishes.
Whilst it is generally presumed that full use would be made of such approaches
for the individual exporting firms, it is also commonly argued that such
techniques should be used by centralised marketing institutions. While there
are undoubtedly many aspects of market management which are extremely
important for agricultural markets, it must be recognised that the body of
theory in this field has been developed with particular emphasis on firms
operating within a certain type of market environment. In almost all of
these cases the fundamental assumption is that the firm involved in marketing
is also the firm involved in production. These conditions are not met in
the marketing of most agricultural products. Whilst the use of marketing
management techniques may be very appropriate in terms of responding to
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consumer requirements, the danger in pursuing these through a single
institution lies in the fact that the all important linkage between
producers and consumers may be broken. This may not be particularly
important in cases where the quality or form of the product which the
consumer purchases is not fully determined by the producer of the raw
product. For example, in the dairy industry this linkage is not
particularly important as the marketing channel is able to convert milk
into a wide range of products of different quality and standards. With
meat production however, this is certainly not the case. As is so
frequently acknowledged, the quality of the product is effectively
determined by the producer. Whilst various characteristics of the product
can be changed through packaging and processing, the fundamental bone and
fat content, and the weight of the carcass are determined by the producer.
For these reasons, it is imperative that very clear and concise linkage
be made so that the appropriate signals are passed back to producers.
This can be ensured through the maintenance of a responsive pricing system.
It is important to recognise that the system of pooling or
consignment selling which had been increasing in New Zealand over the past
few years is a very undesirable system from a market development point of
view. This method of selling which had been criticised so much over the
years, is almost certainly the least responsive to consumer requirements,
as it is simply a case of taking the product to the consumer and realising
the price that consumers are prepared to pay, with returns to producers
pooled over time and product qualities.
It is commonly asserted, that the formation of producer-controlled
marketing organisations is one way that producers can become ·closer l to
consumers' needs, but to the individual producer this depends critically
on the pricing mechanism developed. For example, if a producer's payment
is based on an annual pooled price then he is no better informed than if he
were selling on a consignment basis. The presence of a producer controlled
organisation is no guarantee that all producers will be better informed
about market requirements. This function is dependent on the particular
market mechanisms which are developed.
(4) The allocation of product amongst markets. While this
function is not independent of the other functions discussed above, the
manner in which a marketing system allocates quantities between alternative
markets can be extremely important when designing export market institutions.
In the discussion of problems in the first section of this paper, the
difficulties created by the United Kingdom market were outlined. One of the
main points brought out in-the discussion was that a considerable amount of
this instability was created by the fact that the product was shipped to the
market before it had been sold. This was seen to be especially important
since prices determined in that market were seen to be affecting prices
around the world. In a free market, the quantities to be shipped to
different destinations would normally be determined by price linkages
between the markets, caused by the ability of market intermediaries or even
consumers to transfer the product between markets. With products such as
meat, such activities are limited by the ability to ship product between
final markets. This is due not only to the distribution of these markets,
but also by storage requirements, and other barriers to trade between
regions. In a market of this type, it would normally be expected that
prices would be related back to a market at the source of the product.
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Unfortunately, it is exactly this type of market which has been absent
in New Zealand for many years, and has led to some of the problems
encountered in New Zealand meat marketing. Because of these problems,
it is often felt that there is a major need to carefully control the
quantities which are allocated to particular markets. If however, careful
base point pricing had been utilised over the years, many of these problems
may not have arisen.
Alternative reasons for intervention and controlling market flows
relate to the concept of market segmentation. Market segmentation is an
economic concept, which basically relies on controlling product flows
between sub-markets in which varying sources of demand for the product
concerned have differing price responses. Market segmentation can occur
both between regions and also over various forms of the product. In some
agricultural marketing systems there has been extensive use of this concept.
The most common and the most clearly advantageous use occurs where
segmentation has been used to allocate output to different products. The
most obvious examples of these are the apple and pear marketing system in
New Zealand where the product is allocated between local and overseas fresh
markets and also processed markets such as juice. Another example is the
New Zealand Dairy Board which produces a wide range of different products
and has considerable flexibility in altering the flows between the different
types. The objective of this segmentation is to maximise revenue through
monopolistic control by attempting to equate marginal returns across the
different markets. While segmentation over different forms of the product
is often regarded as being successful in increasing total producer revenue,
the benefit from segmentation of a relatively homogeneous product between
alternative markets is more suspect.
The difficulty in increasing revenue by segmenting markets between
countries lies in the fact that an exporter such as New Zealand is usually
not a monopolist in that particular market. There have been times in the
past when this might have been true; for example, in the period when the
United Kingdom market was extremely dependent on New Zealand sheepmeats.
At the present time however, there is not only competition from domestic
production of sheepmeats in most of our markets, but probably more
importantly, competition from alternative meats such as poultry and pork
which provide very little latitude for any attempt at monopoly pricing.
Because of the highly competitive nature of meat consumption in most of the
western developed countries where our products are sold, there must be very
limited opportunity for New Zealand to exert any market power or to create
substantial price differentials between countries.
It is interesting to note that this is a function which the
proponents of single marketing institutions claim is very important for
an efficient marketing system. It is of some concern that such positions
are taken without very careful research into the actual situation in many
of these markets. The only information which appears to be available is
that presented in Cullwick (1980). In this particular paper the figures
would suggest that there is, in fact, quite a strong similarity between
prices in different countries, except for some cases which are special
contractual arrangements and one case which is obviously a development
market. In other cases, however, the major differences between the f.o.b.
prices quoted appear to be attributable to the form in which the product
is presented. There certainly does not appear to be sufficient evidence
to suggest that very different prices are being charged or should be charged
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for the same product destined for different countries.
In the case of the exports of New Zealand meat, it would appear
that there are very few prospects for any real gain to be made from
market segmentation. In the first place, unlike many of the other
agricultural products exported from New Zealand, there are only limited
opportunities for changing the form of the product in such a way that it
would leave original markets undisturbed. The only suggestion which
appears to have been made in this area, is the idea of converting surplus
meat to meat meal for livestock feed. Whilst this may initially appear a
very dramatic change of product form, if the evidence can be presented to
show that it is in the best national interest, then it is certainly a
viable alternative.
Secondly, the opportunities for segmentation by controlling
quantities allocated to particular markets appear to be somewhat more
limited. There are some exceptions however. In cases where there are
absolute access restrictions such as import quotas it is very important to
ensure that that quota quantity is allocated to exporters from New Zealand
to allow the exporters to reap the benefits from the quota, rather than
have such benefits accrue to the importers in the other country. Other
situations may occur where there is an obvious advantage to be gained by
exerting monopoly power in particular markets, although particular examples
are not immediately obvious, and it must be realised that the cost of such
activity is the holding back of product, which must be sold elsewhere.
The situation of developing markets is also another case where it may be
advantageous for product to be sold at different prices, but this can only
be a temporary situation as in the long run, this market must compete with
other markets as a destination for the product.
While it is often very attractive to visualise a market
allocation system in which very carefully selected quantities are allocated
to each market so that optimal prices are charged in every destination for
our product, it must be remembered that this takes absolutely no account
of the level of supply of the product. In an industrial product, this
would not be a problem as production could be carefully tailored to suit
the required demand with minimal stock levels, but unfortunately, in
agricultural production this is seldom the case and surpluses can very
quickly develop. It is exactly this type of problem which has caused the
current concern in the meat industry, and the call for limitations on
production in the dairy industry.
Even where such limitations are required, there is no reason why
the necessary price differences between regions cannot be maintained by
means other than the creation of a single selling marketing institution~
Whilst that may appear to be the most simple and straight forward solution
to many of these problems, it must be recognised that it can also create
many difficulties such as imbalances between supply and demand.
(5) Access to innovation, technolo and marketing skills. From
the survey work carried out by Ross, Sheppard and Zwart 1982 it could be
seen that much of the new market development which has been carried out in
past years has been initiated by very small firms. In fact, in a highly
competitive business situation the seeking out and development of new
markets is often the 'only way in which new firms can become established and
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remain viable. This surely provides one of the greatest incentives
possible to initiate market developments.
In attempts to design market institutions which meet short term
goals such as profit maximisation and stability it is not uncommon to
overlook the importance of these longer run functions of marketing
institutions. As has already been stated, many people feel that the
problems of the marketing of meat can best be served by the creation of
single selling institutions which carefully control production and the
handling of products within the marketing system. Whilst there may be
many advantages in such a proposal from a market management point of
view, it must be recognised that this is different from the use of market
management in situations where firms compete actively with one another.
Although it can be argued that agricultural export institutions must
compete with other exporters in other countries, this is not complete
competition because they do not compete for inputs, and competing on both
output and input markets is the mechanism which ensures efficiency within
the complete industry. This is not the case in many agricultural examples,
where these institutions become the sole marketing body. Although this
situation makes it extremely difficult to measure the efficiency of these
organisations there are some studies available. As an example of this,
Borrell and Zwart (1982) study the distributional efficiency of the New
Zealand Wheat Board which is the sole agency for handling distribution and
sale of wheat and flour within New Zealand. Problems caused by the lack
of freedom of entry and exit to an industry are often ignored because they
are associated with long run rather than short run problems, but
unfortunately, the institutions are developed to operate in the long run
and are often very inflexible in adapting to these problems.
Even where single marketing institutions are considered to be
desirable, it is imperative that competitive elements be retained in the
marketing system wherever possible. Individual firms associated with a
marketing system are often very quick to point out the benefits of longer
term contractual arrangements which may ensure their returns, or at least
pass some risk on to other parts of the marketing system. This however,
is often not in the nation's best interests, as it leads to lack of free
entry and exit and subsequent loss of efficiency and innovation amongst
these firms. Examples in the New Zealand meat industry would include the
livestock slaughter sector, transportation and any other marketing
agencies which could develop.
3. MARKETING INSTITUTIONS FOR THE NEW ZEALAND MEAT INDUSTRY
In the past few years many alternative institutions have been
proposed and discussed as a means of overcoming many of the problems which
are currently faced by the industry. Points of view range from general
observations based on political ideas and sweeping generalisations based
on superficial comparisons with other industries, to highly detailed
proposals which attempt to reach an apparent compromise between the various
interest groups. The most important task is to decide on the functions
which are required in a marketing system and then to determine how these
functions can be obtained in the most efficient and equitable manner. Too
often the solutions proposed are based on the merits of a very clearly
defined institution such as single sellers, market authorities or the free
market system, without searching for alternatives which may utilise the
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benefits of these extremes.
The general functions of markets discussed in the previous section
of this paper are certainly not an exhaustive and exclusive list of
activities which might be expected to occur in a market system, but it is
hoped that they are the main functions which relate to the problems
presented. This section of the paper attempts to demonstrate how carefully
designed marketing institutions may provide solutions to many of the
problems without leading to far reaching changes in the structure of the
industry. The first alternative presented is that developed in the study
by Ross, Sheppard and Zwart (1982). In comparison to many of the
alternative plans which were put forward at that time, the somewhat detailed
nature of the proposal caused some concern. This concern appears to focus
on the problems of how a national auction system could work. This aspect
of the proposal was not meant to be the major element of the plan. The
most important concept was seen to be that of establishing a national export
price in New Zealand which would ensure equal access for exporters to the
product at a price which was seen to be desirable to the producers. It was
also seen to be important to design a system in which private exporters
could operate alongside a Meat Board which was involved in the buying and
selling of meat. The essence of such a system is that it allows for a
continued comparison of the efficiency of both large controlled sellers and
competitive marketing firms.
In order to demonstrate an alternative way in which these
objectives could be obtained, a second proposal is contained in this study.
This alternative removes any complications which people may feel would arise
from the development of a national auction system. Instead the price
determining mechanism could be replaced by a price established by the Meat
Producers Board. This system has some similarities to that which is currently
used under the Meat Board1s buy back scheme except that it has a larger role
for private firms. Each of these alternatives are discussed separately in
the following subsections.
Option A. A National Carcass Market
It is possible for many of the difficulties discussed in the first
section of this paper to be overcome without the complete removal of
competitive marketing. The alternative suggested here is that the export
pricing of New Zealand meat take place within New Zealand. The most logical
means by which this can take place is the development of a market for trading
in carcass meat within the country. The major change involved in such a
system would be the requirement that all carcasses be offered for sale
within New Zealand after slaughter, and that all export marketing companies
have access to this meat.
It would be envisaged that normally producers would own the stock
until it has been killed and offered for sale on the auction system. The
producer would then deduct from the auction price a killing fee which would
be paid to the company who killed the stock. In effect, the farmer or
owner of the stock at time of slaughter, would enter into a direct
transaction with the export marketing company. This does not imply that
the existing processing companies would only be limited to killing activities,
as they could equally well be represented as purchasers in the market.
16
The mechanics of such a system could possibly depend on a
daily computerised market which would incorporate all meat works within
New Zealand. Such systems are currently used in many countries overseas,
especially for live animal sales. With an efficient grading system such
as that which exists in New Zealand, trading in carcass meat would be
even more efficient. The current grading system pro~ides an adequate
description of individual carcasses for exporters to be able to purchase
meat at any works in the country without actually seeing the meat involved.
Although it is not a large market, these transactions currently take place
between some exporters and major processing companies. What is envisaged
is a more flexible and competitive market of this type which would allow
the daily determination of competitive prices for each individual grade of
meat produced in New Zealand. Exporters would conduct their marketing
operations in much the same manner as they do at present, but there would
be less opportunities for individual companies to become involved in weak
selling. If all meat has been purchased on a competitive market in New
Zealand, the price risk involved in weak selling is placed directly on the
individual exporters, and not on the producers as it can be under a pooling
system.
The major implication of these changes would be that firms whose
primary interest is in the marketing of meat would have access to a larger
quantity of meat, and companies who wish to specialise in killing only,
would be able to ensure that their meat is sold to the highest bidder and
most efficient exporter. At the same time, companies which are currently
involved in both processing and marketing functions and who feel that there
are economies in this situation, would be able to continue to operate, but
with the added advantage of greater flexibility in terms of the quantity of
meat which they would wish to market themselves.
Although the changes suggested are relatively straightforward,
careful consideration would show that it could have considerable impact on
pricing performance and market behaviour within the meat market. The
following points discuss some of the major advantages of this proposal and
at the same time clarify some of the specific mechanisms which might be
involved.
(1) Probably the major advantage of such a scheme is that there would
be increased access by all licensed meat exporters to meat produced
in New Zealand. This is of considerable importance, because in the past
development of successful meat exporting companies has largely been in the
direction of increased facilities for acquiring additional livestock. This
change, which has been caused by the firms inability to acquire product for
marketing, has led to an increased level of vertical integration within
these firms, which is possibly undesirable from a national viewpoint. The
increased access to a wide range of different types of carcass meat would
allow these firms to further expand their operation into the marketing or
further processing field. The market would provide an ideal environment for
firms who wished to develop highly specialised further processing operations.
In this case, the input into the marketing process is a carcass rather than
a live animal. Firms which would wish to be involved in both processing
and the marketing of stock would not be disadvantaged by this system. In
fact, as individual prices would be determined at each works, the firm which
killed the stock would have a purchasing advantage as the carcasses would
already be on their premises.
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(2) The presence of a true auction system for price determination
would have a major advantage in terms of its ability to establish
market related differentials between different grades of meat. At present
differentials are determined by either the schedule system which provides
an estimate of the market differentials, or through the aggregated returns
of the pooling system. The establishment of competitive differentials would
be seen to provide major advantages in terms of guiding producer decisions
and marketing options. The proposal also has obvious implications for the
establishment of new grades such as lightweight lambs or possibly hogget
markets which have been discussed in the recent past.
(3) As has been noted previously, the establishment of a firm market
price in New Zealand could have considerable impact on the
competitive behaviour of firms in overseas markets. Exporting firms who
have purchased a product at the same price as their competitors are likely
to be more responsible in the use of storage facilities and marketing than
organisations which are marketing product on behalf of producers in New
Zealand. If exporting companies are able to sell a product in a market at
a lower price than their competitors even though they have purchased it at
the same price, then it is right that they should do so, as it merely
reflects increased efficiency in marketing and handling. There would be
increased competition not only between competitors serving the same market,
but also competitors servicing different markets. It is possible that
importers in countries such as the U.K. could be involved in purchasing stock
through agents in New Zealand which would mean that they are competing on a
true world market and not simply for the meat which has been landed in the
United Kingdom. This has the potential to lead to increased price stability
in markets such as the United Kingdom. The New Zealand carcass price would
become the true world price and would be used in preference to the current
Smithfield price as the basis for setting long-term and large contracts.
(4) Because the carcass market would be a true auction market, it is
recognised that there is likely to be instability in prices as
producers and exporters react to changing international circumstances. In
the past, producer prices have been stabilised through industry accounts
and supplements, and exporter prices have also been stabilised to some extent
by Meat Board intervention in the exporting activity. Under the proposed
scheme, it is envisaged that this involvement of the Meat Producers Board
would continue in the role of stabilising the national carcass market. As
already discussed such a market provides an ideal basis for the operations
of both industry and government supplementation and stabilisation schemes.
It is obvious that direct involvement would still be required however, and
it is anticipated that the Meat Board would become involved in purchasing
meat on the national carcass market. This activity would be similar to
that practised in the United Kingdom by the Meat Board, with the advantage
that the activity would be carried out in New Zealand. The Meat Board
could operate in a manner similar to the present Wool Board in that they
establish floor prices and then purchase product from the market to maintain
this floor price.
(5) One of the major arguments for a single trading agency was its
ability to deal with large buying markets. A competitive carcass
market could also aid in the handling of these types of contract. First,
the market would provide a realistic price base which could be used to
negotiate prices for the contracts. Second, because the meat to supply the
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contract would be purchased from the market, the value of the contract
would be reflected in all of the prices, and thus all farmers would share
in any benefits associated with the contract even though the company they
are dealing with may not be directly involved. At the present time, the
handling of these contracts has often become extremely complicated as the
total contract is shared between a wide number of exporters to ensure that
the impacts of the contract are spread evenly throughout the market. It is
possible that the Meat Board itself could act as the major contracting
partner for extremely large contracts. In this case they would simply
purchase meat directly from the competitive market to fulfil the contracts.
An alternative, and possibly more desirable outcome, would be that the
importing agency could appoint a local agent to purchase meat directly from
the competitive market to fulfil their needs. This could lead to the more
desirable situation where large fixed contracts become continual purchasing
which is responsive to changes in market prices. At the same time, the
competitive market ensures that all producers share equally in any benefits
which may be associated with individual trades even though their meat may
not be directly consigned to that market.
(6) In the past it has been realised by the Meat Producers Board that
certain markets should be singled out as development markets and
these have often attracted development subsidies or sole access rights.
This practice would continue in the presence of a competitive market and a
levy on all meat sales could be used to afford subsidies for purchases which
are destined for specified development markets. These subsidies would allow
the Meat Producers Board to have some control over market development
programmes in specified regions without necessarily becoming involved them-
selves.
(7) Although it may not appear to be a direct benefit, one of the
implications of a competitive carcass market is that both killing
charges and price differentials between processing works would become explicit.
The fact that these charges become explicit would help to encourage competition
and increased efficiency between processing works. Profitability of processing
would depend entirely on the throughput of plants which should have an
immediate effect on the level of competition in setting processing charges.
This competition would occur both between works and also at different times of
the season. For example, it is possible that killing charges could be lower
at either end of the killing season which would allow a greater spread of
killing at some works.
Price differentials between works would reflect the relative
transport costs for both delivering and assembling meat from those works. If
the internal meat transport policies were liberalised and returned to a more
competitive basis, this would mean that costs would truly reflect the relative
advantages of different works and possibly result in considerable savings from
transport costs between farm and works, and also between works and shipping
ports. Farmers would be expected to make rational economic decisions about
which works their stock should be killed at and at what time of the year. In
doing this the producer would need to balance up killing charges and transport
costs which he would face to get his stock killed. While this would be most
desirable, the liberalisation of the existing transport system is not a
necessary condition for the implementation of the competitive carcass market.
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Option B. Meat Board Pricing
As noted previously, the idea of a national auction market in
the alternative outlined above could be replaced by something equivalent
to the schedule which has been used for many years. A very important
difference however, would be that these prices should not be set as they
have in the past by a group representing both exporters and the Meat
Producers Board. Instead, it would be possible to develop a schedule set
solely by the Meat Producers Board. As well as setting prices, the Meat
Producers Board would be responsible for acquiring the product which private
exporters are unwilling to purchase at that price. The free access of all
exporters to meat and the fixed nature of the base point price in New
Zealand would make it possible to receive the benefits of competitive
export marketing as discussed in the previous alternative. The Meat Board
would accept increased responsibility for the establishment of prices and
the control of stock.
With the ability to own product the Meat Board would also be
available to service particular markets or enter into fixed contractual
arrangements with particular countries where it was felt to be appropriate.
Although this alternative might suggest that the Meat Producers Board would
have excessive influence in the setting of prices, it must be remembered
that any attempt to increase prices above the market level would lead to an
excessive build up of stocks, and alternatively a price set too low would
result in excessive orders from exporters. This is effectively a system of
determining a market price through a process of trial and error. While the
process might be somewhat slower than that which would be attained under an
auction system, it would produce more gradual change in prices, and hence a
form of stability. In terms of its effect on the market the only difference
between this and the previous alternative is that this system would not
generate perfectly competitive price differentials between processing works
and grades of meat. These would still be problems which would have to be
faced by the price setting authority.
Under any scheme which might be developed, it is most desirable
that competitive elements be retained wherever possible. In some cases
this might have little effect on the structure and yet a major effect on
the performance of the industry. For example, in both of these cases it is
most desirable that prices established be quoted for carcass meat and not
include processing and handling charges for farmers. By making farmers aware
of what these charges are, and thereby indicating the difference in charges
between works or operators, it is possible to induce a greater competitive
element in the killing and processing industry. While such changes are
unlikely to be viewed favourably by the meat processing companies, they are
potentially very important for the future development of the industry.
4. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
The alternatives presented in this paper suggest very little
direct role for the government in the marketing of New Zealand meat products.
This does not mean however, that the Government should absolve itself of any
responsibility for developments within the industry. As the authority which
grants the power to create such institutions, it is extremely important that
the Government be continuously involved in monitoring the structure and
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effectiveness of such institutions.
It is also important that the Government playa major role in
the negotiations and discussions over the relevance of such institutions.
As has been seen in the past year, there is a strong likelihood that
solutions reached by a combination of exporters and producer organisations
are likely to result in compromise solutions which transfer the sharing of
risk and responsibility amongst the alternative organisations, while at
the same time offering protection for everybody. The losers in this
situation are those not represented in the negotiations. This became
most apparent when the Meat Board proposed its "Meat Industry Trading
Organisation" plan, but then offered to compromise the principles of the
plan in order to reach agreement with exporters I associations. While these
typ~of solutions may be in the individual organisations short term interest,
they are not necessarily in the best long term or national interest. As
roles of the individual organisations become less clearly defined, mutual
responsibility, cost protection and risk protection is offered to firms
within the overall structure. One of the principles stressed in the
alternatives suggested in this study is that the roles of the individual
meat slaughtering companies, meat exporting companies, and the Meat Board
become very clearly defined. It is this clear definition and the explicit
nature of charges such as killing charges, marketing costs, and market
prices which will provide an on-going measure of the effectiveness of the
marketing system. It must be remembered that in situations such as this
claims of confidentiality may also be used to disguise industry inefficiencies.
The continuation of compromise solutions to the industry problem
are obviously not in the nation1s best long term interest, and can only
engender further uncertainty. It is the Government1s responsibility in any
discussions to ensure that the national interests are best represented and
that the solution to these marketing problems provides a suitable planning
environment for the future for all parties in the meat industry.
- 21
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